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Ia the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH PARKS COMPANY, a Corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
IRON COUNTY, a Body Corporate and 
Politic, and CEDAR CITY CORPORA-
TION, a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 9540 
and 
No. 9753 
Brief of Respondent Iron County 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IRON COUNTY 
The Statement of Facts as given by the plaintiff-appel-
lant is substantially correct. This is a suit brought under 
Section 59-10-14, Utah Code Ann. 1953 for a refund of real 
property taxes assessed by Iron County upon property at 
Cedar City, Utah and known as El Escalante Hotel, for the 
year 1958. On January 1, 1958 this property was owned 
by the appellant but on January 31, 1958 the appellant con-
veyed this property to the other defendant-respondent, 
Cedar City Corporation, a Municipal Corporation, which ac-
cepted the property under a covenant or condition in the 
deed that it would pay any and all taxes legally assessed. 
The lower court sustained the motion of the respondent 
Iron County to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that 
the complaint did not state facts upon which relief could 
be granted. This respondent also joins in the Preliminary 
Statement given by the appellant in its brief. 
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2 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE TAX ASSESSED AND PAID BY THE APPELLANT 
WAS A LEGAL ASSESSMENT AND CANNOT NOW BE 
RECOVERED. 
The claim of the plaintiff-appellant is that although 
the real property in question was O\vned by it on January 
1, 1958, before the taxes for that year were subsequently 
levied and assessed, the property was conveyed to the other 
defendant, Cedar City Corporation, an exempt government-
al body. Therefore, the lien that attached on January 1, 
1958 never ripened into a valid assessment and therefore, 
the taxes for that year were illegal and void. This claim 
is clearly untenable and is based upon a legal fiction and 
unsound reasoning. 
Most states by statute provide for a time certain when 
real property will bear taxes for that particular year. The 
Utah Statute is Section 59-10-3, U. C. A. which provides as 
follows: 
"Every tax upon real property is a lien against the 
property assessed; and every tax due upon improve-
ments upon real estate assessed to other than the 
owner of the real estate is a lien upon the land and 
improvements; which several liens attach as of the 1st 
day of January of each year." 
Also, Section 59-5-4, U. C. A. 1953 provides as follo\vs: 
"The county assessor must, before the 15th day of April 
of each year, ascertain the na1nes of all taxable in-
habitants and all property in the county subject to tax-
ation except such as is required to be assessed by the 
State Tax Con1mission and must assess such property 
to the person by \vhom it was O\vned or claimed, or in 
whose possession or control it \vas, at 12 o'clock m. 
of the first day of January next preceding, and at its 
value on that date ..... " 
It is necessary that there be some date certain as to 
what property and \Yhen it shall bear taxes as the county 
officers must be guided by son1e specific date. The above 
quoted sections setting a definite date must have had in 
mind that property could and \vould be transferred during 
the calendar v00r and it is subn1itted that is the n1ain rea-
son why a definite date is fixed. Subsequent sections to 
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those above quoted set forth the manner and procedure 
for assessing and collecting taxes for the various county 
officers. When these statutes provide that a county asses-
sor shall assess property to the owner as of January 1 and 
that the lien attaches as of this date, the statutes can only 
mean what they say in clear, precise terms. But the plain-
tiff-appellant claims that something more should be read 
into the statutes vvhich is that the Legislature meant that 
the Iie·n of taxes attaches as of January 1 only if a valid 
assessment and levy is thereafter made and that if the 
o\vner conveys the property away before the assessment 
then the owner of January 1 cannot be required to pay. 
But it should make no difference whether the property is 
conveyed away or not as the property must bear the taxes 
and some one will have to pay. It so happens in this case 
that the new owner of the property after January 31 was a 
public body, Cedar City Corporation, normally exempt 
from taxation and without question would have been for 
all subsequent years. But the appellant's argument is suf-
ficently broad that it would make no difference whether 
the new owner was a public body or not because under its 
theory, the same rule would apply as between two private 
owners. The rationale of appellant's argument is that lf 
the property is transferred after the lien date but before 
the assessment date, the old owner cannot be required to 
pay and this would seem to be appellant's argument wheth-
er the ·new owner was a public body or not. If appellant's 
contention is the law, then every time there is a transfer 
of property after January 1 but before the county levy is 
made between the last Monday in July and the second 
Monday in August, the old owner could claim that he could 
not be assessed as he did not own the property when it 
was assessed and the new owner could claim that since 
he did not own the property on January 1 he would not 
have to pay and in every case both the old and new owner 
could question the validity of the tax. This would be so 
whether the new owner was a public body or not. It should 
be obvious to anyone that such a situation was never in-
tended by our legislature. 
If the property was in private ownership as of Janu-
ary 1 the mere fact that it was transferred to a public body 
prior to assessment should in no way interrupt the taxing 
process. All of the authorities relied upon by appellant 
merely held that as to whether a valid lien attaches as of 
January 1 of each year depends upon ~here subsequently 
being a valid levy and assessment. Th1s respondent sub-
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mits that this condition \vas complied with and that there 
was a subsequent assessment and the fact that the prop-
erty was then in publie o\vnership has nothing to do with 
the case. This is particularly so when the new owner ac-
cepted the property under a condition that it assume and 
pay all taxes legally assessed. 
To more clearly sho\v the fallacy in the argument of 
the plaintiff, suppose that in this case the property in 
question had been transferred by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant Cedar City Corporation on July 31, 1958 instead of 
January 31. This would have been before the County made 
its levy. The plaintiff would have had the use and occu-
pancy of the property for seven months of the year and 
would have had all the benefits of the property, including 
making any profit therefrom but \vould have been able t·:} 
escape the payment of any taxes for that year simply by the 
process of conveying it to an exempt public body after 
seven months of the year had elapsed. For the County to 
get any taxes for the year it would be compelled to appor-
tion the taxes based upon ownership, assuming it had the 
power to do so. 
Another vital point should be here considered. The 
payment of taxes, although admittedly an onerous burden, 
goes right to the foundation of all government. In fact no 
government could survive without them, particularly a 
County which usually has no other means of raising rev-
enue. If property owners are permitted to dodge property 
taxes by the method claimed by appellant. it strike.:; right 
at the foundation of government itself and this cannot be 
permitted. 
Furthermore; if transferring of property during the 
year v:as intended to be taken into consideration in deter-
mining who would pay taxes, there \vould be statutory 
authority and m·arbinery for apportioning taxes but in-
stead of any such statutory authority in our code, a 
definiate date i~-; set, January 1, as to \Yhen the prop-
erty shall bear taxes and the on 'Y concern of the county 
officers is to determine the o\vner as of tl'at date and as-
sess accordingly. 
As to \vhether a transfer of property after the lien 
date bnt befo1'e the assessment date, and even to a public 
body makes any difference has been ruled upon in a nnr;l-
her of cases anr1_ contrary to the theory of the appellant. 
The case of J...~ogan vs. Luukinen, 231 Pac. 184 (Ore.) held 
as follows: 
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"The rule supported by the authorities is that when 
the statute declares a lien from a certain date, the 
lien is an encumbrance although the amount of the lien 
may not yet be deter1nined or collectible. When de-
termined, the lien dates by relation by the date fixed 
by statute." 
Also in Broadway-Madison Corporation vs. Fisher, 102 Pac. 
2d 194, (Ore.) it was held: 
"The accrual of the tax occurs on the date when there 
arises a liability to pay such taxes and not when the 
mechanics of computing the amount of taxes have 
been completed or when the tax is due and payable." 
The case of City of Santa Monica vs. Los Angeles County, 
115 Pac. 945 also held that it made no difference as to a 
transfer of property after the lien had attached and that 
the owner on the lien date must pay the taxes. Likewise, 
the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. 
Alabama, 313 U. S. 274 which was a case in which the 
u·nited States acquired land subsequent to the tax date 
but prior to the date of levy. The state of Alabar.na claimed 
the tax lien effective even though the land passed into 
government ownership afterward and the Supreme Court 
so held and the tax was held to be legal and collectible. 
The Utah case of Gillmor vs. Dale, 75 Pac. 932 is re-
lied upon strongly by the appellant to support its con-
tentions. There certain property which had been within 
the corporate limits of Sale Lake City was segregated 
from the City by a segregation suit. The decree in the seg-
regation suit was entered by the District Court in May 
of the year in question, which would be after the tax date, 
which was then the first Monday in February but before 
the levy. The decree in the segregation suit expressly 
provided that the property disconnected from the city 
would bear no taxes. In other words, there is a valid court 
judgment expressly exempting the property from taxes 
from the date of the judgment. This could have, and, from 
the court's language, did have considerable weight in hold-
ing as the court did. Furthermore, there is another vital 
distinguishing feature which is that the taxes in question 
were paid under protest and this will be discussed under 
respondent's Point No. III. 
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Point No. II. 
IF THE APPELLANT HAS ANY RIGHT OF RECOV-
ERY, IT IS ONLY AS AGAINST THE DEF't-:NDANT 
CEDAR CI'TY CORPORA'riON. 
The respondent Iron County contends and believes the 
authorities above cited so show that the tax in question \Vas 
legally levied and assessed and that some one will have to 
pay the taxes for the year 1958. If not the appellant, then 
it will have to be the new ovvner, Cedar City Corporation. 
On this particular point, this respondent joins in the brief 
of the appellant and specifically to Ppint II of the Appen-
lant's brief. It \vould serv~ no purpose in this brief to re-
iterate the argument of the appellant as to this point. This 
respondent has no additional or more convincing au-
thority than that in the brief of the appellant and will 
therefore, rely upon the brief of the appellant. This 
respondent feels that the cases therein cited of United 
States vs. Alabama, 313 tJ. S. 274, State vs. Salt Lake Coun-
ty, 85 Pac. 2d 851 and State vs. Duchesne County, 85 Pac. 
2d 860 definitely hold that \X/hen Cedar City Corporation 
took title to the property in question, that the property 
was already encumbered by 1958 taxes and vvhen it accept-
ed title with a provision in the deed that it \Vould pay all 
taxes assessed, it could only have meant these 1958 taxes. 
Therefore, it is Cedar City Corporation \vhich should refund 
the taxes if any are to be refunded. 
Point III. 
BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF lJ1AH PARKS COMPANY 
CAN RECOVER THE TAXES PAID, IT IS NECES-
SARY THAT THE TAXES \VERE PAID UI\DER PRO-
TEST AS PRO\TIDED BY STATUTE. 
It is the third contention of the defendant Iron 
County that these taxes, in order to be refunded, \Vould 
have had to have been paid under protest, but the plain-
tiff ad1nits that they \vere not. It is true that the plaintiff 
undoubtedly pays a great an1ount of taxes 2nd undoubtedly 
pays them up8n sub1nission of the tax notice and in son1e 
instances, taxes are paid ,,·hich probably \vould not have to 
be paid. Ho\vever by the same token, the plaintiff un-
doubtedly has a great array of accountants and auditors 
Yvho handle all tax problems and it \':auld not have been 
any great burfl.c"\n on the plaintiff to have discovered \\·hat 
it is now claiming and paid these taxes under protest. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
l'l~covery of taxes by the plaintiff will have to be upon one 
of t.wo different statutes, one being Section 59-10-14, herein 
designated as the voluntary but absolutely void tax and 
the other being Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. or the payment 
under protest statute. Section 59-10-14 provides as follows: 
"The board of county commissioners, upon sufficient 
evidence being produced that property has been er-
roneously or illegally assessed, may order the county 
treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the prop-
erty erroneously or illegally assessed to be deducted 
before payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest and costs 
paid more than once, or erroneously or illegally col-
lected, may, by order of the board of county commis-
sioners, be refunded by the county treasurer, and the 
portion of such taxes, interests and costs, paid to the 
state or any taxing unit, must be refu·nded to the coun-
ty, and the proper officer must draw his warrant there-
for in favor of the county." 
Section 59-11-11, Utah Code provides as follows: 
"In all cases of levy taxes, licenses, or other demands 
for public revenue which is deemed unlawful by the 
party whose property is thus taxed, or from whom 
such tax or license is den1anded or enforced, such 
party may pay under protest such tax or license, or 
any part thereof deemed unlawful, to the officers des-
ignated and authorized by la vv to collect the same; 
and thereupon the party so paying or his legal repre-
sentative may bring an action in any court of compet-
ent jurisdiction against the officer to whon1 said tax 
or license 'vas paid, or against the state, county, muni-
cipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the same 
\vas collected, to recover said tax or license or any 
portion thereof paid under protest." 
These two sections have been discussed in several 
cases by the Supreme Court of lTtah and in these cases, 
this court makes a distinction as to the nature of the claim. 
In the case of Nielsen vs. Sanpete County, 123 Pac. 334, 
the taxes had been assessed against some mortagages, 
for the vears 1907, 1908 and :1909. Prior to 1906 mortgages 
coP1d be taxed but in that year our Constitution was 
amended so as to eliminate mortgages from taxation and 
therefore, on January 1, 1907 and for all the subsequent 
years, such mortgages could not be taxed. Sanpete Coun-
ty, hO\\'Cver, had ass~ssed taxes for the years in question 
~.nd they were not p.a1d under protest. The assessment and 
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collection of these taxes were clearly void as they were in 
direct contravention of our Constitution. In that case the 
taxpayer presented a claim for a refund under Section 59-
10-14 and when it was refused, filed the action. The Court, 
however, made a distinction when it said that it was ob-
vious to anyone that the taxes were illegal from the first 
instance and that section 59-10-14 could be relied upon 
as a basis for a refund. This court stated, however, that 
in any instance where a refund was in doubt and would 
have to be ruled upon by a court, then it would be neces-
sary that the taxes be paid under protest. It appears that 
such a situation prevails in this case in view of Sections 
59-5-4 and 59-10-3, U. C. A. which impose upon the county 
assessor the duty of assessing and collection the taxes, 
irrespective of a transfer of the property, based upon the 
ownership as of January 1, particularly in view of the fact 
that the new owner, Cedar City Corporation, accepted the 
property under a covenant to pay the taxes. It is clear from 
the Nielsen case that Section 59-10-14 only applies when the 
tax assessed has always been void as this Court held, in 
using the language of the Nielsen case, this statute ap-
plies in situations where "it is clear the County has ·no 
authority to collect and where the County Commissioners 
may readily adjust the matter" and where the "illegality 
of the tax is absolutely assumed." But the case at bar is 
not such a case. The law provides that the county officers 
are to assess property as of the ownership on January 1 
and it would we incumbent upon them to follow the law. 
This is not a situation where the tax had no semblance of 
legality or "warrant of law" to use Justice Wolfe~s lang-
uage in the Wilson case, infra, but instead presented a le-
gal question upon which the County Commissioners could 
not rule as they would not understand the niceties of the 
law. Instead it would present a situation of whether or 
not the tax was lawful or unlawful, to use the language 
of Section 59-11-11 and in such cases the tax would be 
paid under protest so as to permit a court of competent 
jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is obvious that when 
Section 59-10-14 states that when "sufficient evidence" is 
presented to the County Commissioners more than merely 
a formal claim would have to be presented but instead 
"evidence" which would indicate beyond any doubt that 
the tax was illegal and void, and the County Commissioners 
could summarily adjust the matter. 
The Utah case of Wilson vs. Weber County, 111 Pac. 
2d 147 was another case which discusses the difference in 
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these t\T.ro statutes. This \Vas a case for a refund of excess 
probate fees collected by the County Clerk and not paid 
under protest. This Court had ruled in the case of Smith 
vs. Carbon County, 63 Pac. 2d 259 that the taxes in ques-
tion were illegal and void and although this decision had 
not been handed down so as to guide the officers of Weber 
County, the Court in the Carbon County case held that the 
tax had al ,,·ays been void and therefore was in fact void 
at the time of the payment of the excess fees to Weber 
County. Therefore, the taxes were void from the begin-
ning and at the time Weber County collected them. In 
other words this court followed the ruling of the Nielsen 
case and held that since the probate fees paid had always 
been void and illegal, it \vas not necessary to have paid 
them under protest. It is true that Justice \\?'olfe dissented 
in the Wilson case which dissent was joined in by Justice 
McDonough, but it is clear that Justice \Volfe objected to 
the finding that it made no difference whether the Carbon 
County case had been handed down so as to be a guide to 
the vVeber County Officers and he felt that until the offi-
cers of Weber County had something to guide them, they 
\Vould not know that the tax was illegal and void. Justice 
\Volfe in his dissenting opinion in the Wilson case felt that 
the taxes \\lOUld have had to be paid under protest before 
they could be refunded. However, the majority opinion fol-
lo\ved the Nielsen case by holding that the taxes in ques-
tion were al\vays illegal and void and it was not necessary 
to pay them under protest .. 
It should be noted that we have t\vo statutes govern-
ing the refund of taxes paid. If there are two statutes then 
there must be some reason yet under the argument of the 
appellant. either o1· both apply to the same situation. But 
\vhen the Legislature adopted t\vo different statutes, which 
adn1ittedly are a change in the common law rule, the Leg-
islature must have intended that the t\vo statutes apply 
to two different situations as pointed out in both the Niel-
sen and Wilson cases. 
Although \Ve do not kno\v why the Utah Parks Com-
pany or its parent company, Union Pacific Railroad Con1-
pany, paid these taxes voluntarily and not. under protest 
it is reasonably safe to assume that the officials of appel-
lant or Union Pacific Railroad did not discover for several 
r:1onths after the taxes had been paid that perhaps they 
hact naid some taxes to Iron Cot~nty unnecessarily and 
··ince .. thev \vere not paid under protest it was necessary 
f:Jr the a·ppellant to rely upon the other statute, Section 
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59-10-14 as that is the only way it could get into court. 
But it is the very earnest contention of this respondent that 
the appellant would have had to come in under the other 
statute, being Section 59-11-11, or the payment under pro-
test statute. 
The wisdom i'n the statute requiring that before a re-
fund of taxes can be claimed, the taxes must have been 
paid under protest is obvious. Both cities and counties by 
law, adopt their budget in the latter end of the year when 
taxes are being paid. The county for instance makes up a 
tentative budget by November 1 and the final budget is 
adopted by the e·nd of the year. Cities likewise adopt a 
budget in December of each year. Therefore if any taxes 
are claimed to be invalid or illegally assessed and are paid 
under protest, the county or city would have an opport-
tunity to make a notation of the possibility of refund of 
taxes when they adopt their budget and could provide ac-
cordingly. In this case, however, the 1958 taxes were lev-
ied and assessed and paid by the taxpayer in November 
of 1958; all revenues were budgeted by the county and the 
county was never put on notice until the latter end of July, 
1959 when a claim was filed by the plaintiff. By this time, 
all of the money had been budgeted and over one-half of 
it spent and for the county to now refund $7,082.88 and 
interest \vi11 be a burdensome obligation and places the 
county in a precarious position not of its own making 
In the case of Gillmor vs. Dale, 75 Pac. 932 (Utah), one 
of the main cases relied upon by the appellant was a case 
where the taxes were paid under protest and does not 
support the appellant in its claim that it can recover the 
taxes under Section 59-10-14. 
Point IV 
THE TAXES WERE VOLUNTARILY PAID, NOT 
UNDER PROTEST AND CANNOT NOW BE RECOV-
ERED. 
It was the common law rule that taxes paid voluntari-
ly could not be recovered and the following cases so hold: 
Corwin Inc. Co. vs. "''hite 6 Pac. 2nd 607 (Wash.) 
Pacific Finance Corp. vs. Spokane County, 15 Pac. 2nd 
652 (Wash.) 
Glendale Union High School District vs. Peoria School 
District, 99 Pac. 2nd 482, (Ariz.) 
Flynn vs. City and County of San Francisco, 115 Par. 
2nd 3 (Cal.) 
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Jaymes vs. Herom, 130 Pac. 2nd 29 (N. M.) 
Board of Commissioners of Morgan County vs. Doherty, 
168 Pac. 2nd 556 (Colo.) 
Moses vs. Board of County Commissioners, 242 Pac. 
2nd 743 (Kan.) 
In many cases, however, this common law rule work-
ed a hardship upon the taxpayer and many states, the 
same as Utah, have adopted statutes changing the com-
mon law rule. The statutes adopted in Utah are Section 
59-10-14 where taxes that were illegal, erro·neous or void 
and levied without a semblance of authority or warrant of 
la\v could be recovered by the simple process of submit-
ting evidence to the County Commission of the illegality 
and which would be clear to any one and other being Sec-
tion 59-11-11, \vhere taxes, claimed to be unlawful, could be 
paid under protest and then having the illegality adjudi-
cated. But unless one of these statutes apply, we \vould 
still have the common la \V rule. The appellant admits 
that the taxes were not paid under protest so we are not 
concerned with this statute and as shown above the taxes 
in this case are not so illegal, erroneous or void as to con1e 
\vithin the provisions of Sec. 59-10-14, and are ·not the kind 
of taxes intended by this statute and therefore, the appel-
lant cannot recover under Sec. 59-10-14. Therefore, we 
are right back to the common law rule of voluntary pay-
ment and \Vhich is that the taxes cannot be recovered. 
CONCLUSION 
The authorities hold that the tax \vith which vve are 
herein concerned was legally levied and assessed. The 
tax could only be questioned as to its lawfulness or unlaw-
fulness and to do this, it \vas necessary that the tax be 
paid under protest, which it was not. Since it was not paid 
under protest and was not a tax \vholly illegal and void and 
without a semblance of authority, then neither of the re-
medial statutes regarding the refunding of taxes can be 
relied upon by the appellant and therefore, this is a situa-
tion of a voluntary payment of taxes which cannot be re-
covered. Furthermore, if the ta~<: is legal, the appellant's 
only redress is against Cedar City Corporation and not Iron 
County. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OR\riLLE ISOM, County 
Attorney, Attorney for 
Iron County. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
